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ABSTRACT
Claims about reduction or emergence appear in cases in which there are different levels 
of facts that have between them some kind of ontological connection by which one of 
them is ‘made up’ from the other. In the case of reduction, it is supposed that the reduced 
level of facts is ‘nothing over’ the reducing level of facts. In the case of emergence, on the 
other hand, it is supposed that the emergent level is something ‘new’ with respect to the 
emergence base. In both reduction and emergence some kind of ontological priority of one 
level with respect to the other is involved, as well as some kind of explanatory asymmetry 
between them. In recent years a lot of work has been devoted to different notions of on-
tological priority, like grounding and dependence, that might be useful for the clarification 
of the more traditional questions about the nature of reduction and emergence. This work 
presents and discusses various attempts to make that clarification. 
Keywords: reduction, emergence, grounding, dependence, levels of reality.
RESUMEN
Las alegaciones sobre reducción o emergencia aparecen en casos en que hay diferentes 
niveles de hechos que tienen entre sí cierto tipo de conexión ontológica por la que uno de 
ellos está ‘construido’ del otro. En el caso de la reducción, se supone que el nivel de hechos 
reducido es ‘nada por sobre’ el nivel de hechos reductor. En el caso de la emergencia, por 
otra parte, se supone que el nivel emergente es algo ‘nuevo’ respecto de la base de emer-
gencia. Tanto en la reducción como en la emergencia está envuelto un tipo de prioridad 
ontológica de un nivel respecto del otro, así como cierto tipo de asimetría explicativa entre 
ellos. En años recientes se ha dedicado mucho trabajo a diferentes nociones de prioridad 
ontológica, como la fundación  (grounding) y la dependencia, que pueden ser útiles para 
la clarificación de las cuestiones más tradicionales sobre la naturaleza de la reducción y la 
emergencia. Este trabajo presenta y discute varios intentos de hacer tal clarificación. 
Palabras clave: reducción, emergencia, fundación, dependencia, niveles de realidad.
1 Professor do Instituto de Filosofía 
da Pontificia Universidad Católica 
de Chile. Campus San Joaquín. Av. 
Vicuña Mackenna 4860, Macul – 
Santiago, 7820436, Chile. Email: 
jalvaram@uc.cl / jose.tomas.alvara-
do@gmail.com.
Filosofia Unisinos 
Unisinos Journal of Philosophy
20(1):3-12, jan/apr 2019
Unisinos – doi: 10.4013/fsu.2019.201.01
Emergence and reduction
Emergencia y reducción
José Tomás Alvarado1
José Tomás Alvarado
Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 20(1):3-12, jan/apr 2019 4
Questions about whether some facts are or not ‘re-
ducible’ to or ‘emergent’ in relation to others appear where 
there are different ‘levels’ that seem to have some ontological 
correlation between them. In general terms, the concepts of 
‘reduction’ and ‘emergence’ have been considered to be con-
traries. When one level of facts seems to be ‘nothing over and 
above’ the more basic level, philosophers have been inclined 
to say that one of the levels ‘reduces’ to the more basic one. 
When, on the contrary, there is a real ontological difference 
between the levels, philosophers have been inclined to say 
that one level is ‘emergent’ in relation to the more basic one. 
Claims about reduction and emergence have been frequent 
not only in philosophy of science, but also in many other ar-
eas. For example, it has been contended that mental states 
reduce to physical or biological facts about the brain and its 
environment, it has been contended that dispositions reduce 
to categorical properties, or it has been contended that causal 
connections reduce to regularities in the occurrence of types 
of events. The problem here is that it has been notoriously 
difficult to analyze the concept of ‘reduction’ (cf. van Riel, 
2014) and, also, it has been difficult to analyze the concept 
of ‘emergence’. 
There has been a lot of recent work on the clarification 
of several concepts of ontological priority, like the concepts 
of grounding and ontological dependence. These notions of on-
tological priority precisely have to do with ontological hierar-
chies in which some facts are basic in relation to others. The 
same hierarchies that have motivated the claims of ‘reduction’ 
or of ‘emergence’. The objective of this work is to consider the 
impact that these recent developments might have for the 
traditional questions concerning reduction and emergence. 
Works of Gideon Rosen (2010) and Elizabeth Barnes (2012) 
have advanced in important ways in the elucidation of both 
the notions of ‘reduction’ and ‘emergence’ from the vantage 
point of a greater clarity about forms of ontological priority. 
What will be pointed out, nonetheless, is that the connection 
between reduction and grounding proposed by Rosen has 
several shortcomings. 
1. Reduction and emergence
The main intuition behind claims of reduction is that 
reduced entities or theories are nothing more than the re-
ducing entities or theories. There have been various ways of 
making this intuition precise. Reduction has been presented 
as a relation between ‘theories’, ‘concepts’, ‘models’, ‘properties’ 
or ‘events’. Reduction itself has been charact erized either as a 
relation of ‘deduction between theories’, or as ‘mapping func-
tions between models’, or as an ‘analogy between theories’, or 
as an ‘identity of properties’. There is a reason for this variety 
of formulations, as pointed out below.  
Nagel (cf. 1961, chap. 11) proposed that ‘reduction’ should 
be taken as a relation between theories. A theory T
1
 is reduced 
to a theory T
2
 if and only if T
1
 can be deduced from T
2
 in con-
junction with some coordinating definitions or bridge laws that 
correlate the terms of T
1
 with the terms of T
2
. A ‘theory’ is con-
ceived as a set of sentences in a language closed with resp ect to 
logical deduction. ‘Bridge laws’ are quantified biconditionals that 
connect the terms of the reduced theory with the terms of the 
reducing theory. Bridge principles or coordinating definitions are 
statements that must be justified empirically as natural laws. This 
coordination allows the ‘explanation’ of the reduced theory by 
the reducing theory plus bridge principles. ‘Reduction’ of one the-
ory by another is, then, an instance of ‘explanation’ as understood 
by the nomological-deductive view. This syntact ic charact eriza-
tion was proposed to capture the situation when an old theory 
is superseded by a new one that can ‘retain’ the theoretical ad-
vantages and the empirical results of the former. It was proposed 
to capture the situation when a new theory can ‘explain’ the old 
one. Cases of this sort are – in principle – the relation of classical 
mechanics to relativistic mechanics, or the relation of thermody-
namics to statistical mechanics. There are many problems with 
this charact erization of reduction that need not be detailed here2. 
It has been notorious that most of the discussions concerning 
Nagelian reduction have focused on the nature of bridge princi-
ples. Nagel made a syntact ic charact erization of those principles, 
but it is clear that much more than a formal charact erization is 
required. A quantified biconditional of the form ∀x (Fx ↔ Gx) 
can be true in virtue of semantic stipulation or in virtue of a gen-
eral causal connection by which the satisfact ion of F causes the 
satisfact ion of G, and nothing satisfies G except if it is caused by 
the satisfact ion of F. But these are not cases of reduction. It seems 
that it is further required that what the relevant terms connected 
by the bridge principles designate should be the ‘same’. 
These discussions have shown that in a claim of reduc-
tion there is an explanatory element. In some sense, the re-
ducing theory or entity should explain the reduced theory or 
entity. But, at the same time, in a claim of reduction there is 
an ontological element, because it is supposed that the entities 
about which the theories in question talk are ‘the same’. This 
2 For example, in the so-called ‘new wave’ model (cf. Bickle, 1998, p. 23-55) it is sustained that bridge laws play no role in inter-theoretic 
reductions. They are the result of a successful reduction, and not a premise in it. In the ‘new wave’ perspective, there is deduction but 
not between the reducing theory T
2
 and the reduced theory T
1
, but between T
2
 and a corrected theory T
1
*, that is in an ‘analog relation’ 
with T
1
. The fact that the ‘analog relation’ obtains between T
1
 and T
1
* warrants some ‘bridge principles’ by which the referents of the 
terms in the reduced theory T
1
 are assigned as referents of terms of the reducing theory T
2
. The defenders of the structuralist conception 
of scientific theories, on the other hand, have pointed out that theories are not sets of sentences but sets of models satisfying certain 
constraints (Balzer, Moulines & Sneed, 1987). The Nagelian view of reduction presupposes – for them – an incorrect conception of the-
ories and also an inadequate conception of explanation – the deductive-nomological view. Inter-theoretic reduction in the structuralist 
conception is a matter of mapping the structures of different models. That is, it is a matter of set-theoretic isomorphisms, because 
‘models’ are conceived as set-theoretic entities.
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seems in principle incoherent, because nothing can be explan-
atory of itself. But the point in a reduction claim is to show 
that there are different ‘descriptive’ ways of presentation of 
the ‘same’ entity or domain of entities, but with a certain ex-
planatory directionality between those descriptions. One of 
them explains the other. As van Riel has put it in a recent 
assessment of all the debate:
[A] sentence of the form ‘F-ness reduces to 
G-ness’ expresses a truth if and only if (i) for 
every x, if x is F then (x is F because x is G), 
and (ii) F-ness = G-ness (van Riel, 2014, p. 4).
That is, there is an explanatory direction between the 
reduced F and the reducing G – F-ness obtains because G-ness 
obtains – but there is also some kind of ontological ‘sameness’. 
Of course, this claim of ontological ‘sameness’ should be treat-
ed with extreme caution, as discussed below. It seems that 
there are real cases of identity of the explanandum with the 
explanans, but it seems also that there are cases in which there 
is strict grounding that is incompatible with identity. Because 
nothing can be an explanation for itself, reduction claims 
should consider ‘ways’ in which entities are given to us. This is 
the reason why in the debate sometimes reduction has been 
presented as a relation between ‘theories’, ‘concepts’ or ‘mod-
els’. The explanatory value of a reduction comes not from a 
supposed relation between entities but from an epistemic re-
lation between different ‘representations’ of entities. 
There has been also a variety of proposals concerning 
the concept of ‘emergence’. The core intuition in a claim of 
emergence seems to be that some ‘level’ of entities, although 
ontologically ‘connected’ to another more basic level, is some-
thing over or above the entities that constitute the base. If 
there are two different objects, located in disjointed regions 
of space, there is no question whether one of those objects is 
something ‘over or above’ the other. One is inclined to think 
in a relation like ‘emergence’, nonetheless, when this difference 
is not obvious. Emergence requires ontological distinctions 
where there seems to be just one entity. Emergence requires, 
then, some kind of ontological relation between different ‘lev-
els’ of facts, or states of affairs. One very popular conception 
of ‘emergence’ understands it as a form of strong nomological 
supervenience (cf., for example, Kim, 1999, 2006). Under this 
conception, if x has F, F is an emergent property iff (i) the in-
stantiation of F supervenes with nomological necessity on the 
properties instantiated by parts of x or the relations between 
those parts; (ii) the instantiation of F does not supervene with 
logical necessity on the properties and relations of the parts of 
x; and (iii) at least some of the natural laws that determine the 
supervenience of the instantiation of F on the properties and 
relations of the parts of x are fundamental. A natural law L is 
fundamental iff the obtaining of L is not entailed by other laws 
possibly in conjunction with some boundary conditions. In 
this charact erization, emergence is a matter of supervenience 
determined by brute nomological facts. In this conception of 
emergence there is an account of the connection between dif-
ferent levels of facts: one of them is ‘covariant’ on the other. 
There is also something ‘over and above’ the facts of the base, 
because it is a fundamental – brute – nomological fact that 
the base gives rise to the emergent facts. 
There are well-known criticisms of this conception of 
emergence. It has been argued that it requires the postulation 
of epiphenomenal entities (cf. Kim, 1999, p. 25-40; 2006, p. 
81-84). Suppose that an emergent event E
1
 has as superve-
nient base the event B
1
. The emergent event E
1
 causes anoth-
er event of the same level E
2
. Insofar as E
2
 is also a higher-level 
event, it should have a supervenient base B
2
. But then, there 
are two events that compete for the explanation of why E
2
 
obtains: E
1
 and the supervenient base B
2
. If E
1
 is going to have 
any causal efficacy, it must cause the supervenient base B
2
. But 
the supervenient base B
1
 is nomologically sufficient for E
1
 – by 
hypothesis, assuming that ‘emergence’ is nomological strong 
supervenience – and E
1
 is nomologically sufficient for B
2
 –by 
hypothesis, assuming that causation at least entails nomological 
sufficiency –, then B
1
 is nomologically sufficient for B
2
, and 
the causal contribution of E
1
 turns out to be otiose. 
The main problem envisaged, then, is that the super-
venience account does not seem to allow for authentic new 
causal powers for the emergent entities. Several later propos-
als have attempted to correct this defect. O’Connor (2000, 
p. 108-125) and O’Connor & Wong (2005) proposed a dia-
chronic and dynamic conception of emergence. The idea is 
that there is no synchronic supervenience between the base 
event and the emergent event. The base event must be taken 
as causing the emergent event at a temporal delay. The emer-
gent event, in its turn, can later on interact causally with its 
base or with other supervenient bases. Another important 
alternative to the treatment of emergence as strong nomo-
logical supervenience is the proposal of Humphreys (1997). 
On Humphreys’ view the properties of the base – and, cor-
relatively, the events of those properties being instantiated 
– are connected in a primitive operation of ‘fusion’. Fusion 
produces a new property with new causal powers that super-
sede the causal powers of the fused properties of the base. The 
emergent events, then, are never in competition with their 
base, because there is no longer any base with definite caus-
al powers. None of these alternative conceptions require the 
rejection of the idea that emergence is strong nomological su-
pervenience, but they introduce some drastic qualifications in 
the original scheme. 
In all these treatments, the base event is not expected 
to explain the emergent event. While in the cases of reduc-
tion there is an explanatory connection between the reducing 
and the reduced, in the cases of emergence there is no such 
connection. The lack of explanatory directionality between 
the base and the emergent, nonetheless, has to be combined 
with an ontological connection between the base and the 
emergent level. In the case of reduction, it is surprising that 
something that seems to be a complex of different things is 
really ‘the same’ thing. In the case of emergence, on the oth-
er hand, what is surprising is that something that seems to 
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be ‘the same’ thing is really a complex with different entities 
connected between them, yet really different and where the 
higher emergent level is not explained by its lower base. In 
a case in which one comes to know that there is reduction, 
there is epistemic gain because one comes to know that there 
is explanatory ‘sameness’ between seemingly different phe-
nomena. In a case in which one comes to know that there 
is emergence, there is epistemic gain because one comes to 
know that there is no explanatory ‘sameness’ in what appears 
to be just one phenomenon. 
2. Grounding and dependence
Philosophers have made claims about ‘grounding’ or ‘de-
pendence’ almost since the beginning of philosophical reflec-
tion. More attention to those concepts, nonetheless, has been 
only a recent development. A milest one in these develop-
ments was the contribution of Kit Fine on the concepts of ‘es-
sence’ and ‘dependence’ (cf. Fine, 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c). 
With the development of quantified modal logic, it was as-
sumed that the notions of ‘essence’ and ‘dependence’ could be 
easily analyzed in terms of the modal operators □ and , or 
their semantic correlatives, possible worlds and sets of objects 
assigned as their inhabitants. The obvious analyses of essence 
and dependence were:
[Essence] F is essential to x =
df
 □(∃y (y = x) → Fx)
[Dependence] x depends on y =
df
 □(∃z (z = x) → ∃v (v = y))
But all that is guaranteed by these analyses is some mo-
dal covariance between entities. Essential properties just are 
the properties that something has in all possible worlds in 
which it exists. Something depends on the entities – what-
ever those may be – that exist in all the possible worlds in 
which it exists. Modal covariance, nonetheless, is incapable of 
capturing explanatory asymmetries and different directions 
of ontological determination. By the definitions of Essence and 
Dependence, it turns out that everything is dependent on 
necessary entities that exist invariably in all possible worlds. 
If, for example, mathematical objects are necessary, every sin-
gle object depends on number 2. But it is clear that my identity 
– what I am – has nothing to do with number 2. Even more, 
all facts about essences – according to the definition of Es-
sence above – are necessary. Hence, all facts about essences 
should be part of any essence. Hence, just by knowing one 
essence one comes to know all essences. In any possible world 
in which an object x exists it exists also the singleton set {x}. It 
seems preposterous to think, though, that x is dependent on 
{x}. So, the treatment in quantified modal logic seems to erase 
important differences in ontological priorities and in the con-
tent of non-trivial essences. Something analogous seems to 
happen with the concept of ‘supervenience’. Supervenience is 
just a kind of modal covariance that cannot discriminate the 
direction of ontological priority. For example, facts about the 
existence of objects are supervenient on facts about the exis-
tence of singleton sets whose elements are those objects. In 
effect, if there is any variation in facts about whether certain 
objects exist or not, there should be a variation about wheth-
er certain singleton sets exist. Clearly, though, the relation of 
ontological priority goes the other way around. 
The alternative proposed by Fine is to treat ‘essence’ as 
a primitive. It is just a primitive fact that some properties are 
part of the content of the essence of something3. The facts 
of metaphysical modality do not determine facts about es-
sences; rather, it is the other way around. Facts about essences 
of the different entities determine metaphysical modal facts. 
Ontological dependence can be analyzed in term of essence. 
An object x is dependent on y iff it is part of the essence of x 
that y exists. In the notation devised by Fine (cf. 1995c) ‘it is 
part of the essence of x that Fx’ is expressed as ‘□xFx’. Then:
[Dependence*] x depends on y =
df
 □x(∃z (z = x) → ∃v (v = y))
Facts about essences and ontological dependencies are funda-
mental. Ontological dependence is a strict order, irreflexive, 
asymmetric and transitive4. 
The more recent treatments about ‘grounding’ follow 
the same lines. Grounding has been proposed as a primitive 
ontological relation, not amenable to analysis by other more 
basic notions (for general presentations, cf. Correia & Schnie-
der, 2012b; Clark & Liggins, 2012; Raven, 2015). It does not 
follow from this primitive charact er that there is nothing 
intelligible to say about grounding. The notion should sat-
isfy several theoretical restrictions that, although not suffi-
3 Assuming that it is a primitive fact that some properties are part of the essence of x, other senses of ‘essence’ can be defined. The 
‘constitutive essence’ of x is just the collection of properties that constitute the ‘identity’ of x, determining what x is. All the properties 
that follow from the constitutive essence are the ‘consequential essence’. Then, for example, it is not part of the constitutive essence of 
x that x is an element of {x}, but it is part of its consequential essence.
4 There has been some dispute about whether dependencies are a strict partial order – that is, irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive, 
although not connected (cf. Jenkins, 2011; Wilson, 2014; Thompson, 2016; Barnes, forthcoming). But it is obvious that dependence 
is transitive – by the analysis above in Dependence* – and it should be taken to be irreflexive. Otherwise all the debates concerning 
substances as ‘independent entities’ could be unmotivated. It is clear that it is an irreflexive relation of dependence that is in question 
in those debates. If dependence is transitive and irreflexive, then it should be asymmetric. These considerations do not prevent from 
stipulating another concept of ‘weak dependence’ that can be analyzed as:
[Weak Dependence] x weakly depends on y =
df
 □
x
(((∃z (z = x) → ∃v (v = y)) ∨ (x = y))
That is, weak dependence is strong dependence or identity. Weak dependence is trivially reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric.
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cient for a full-fledged analysis, help in making it precise. A 
primitive concept of grounding will prove fruitful if ground-
ing can illuminate other concepts and do theoretical work 
that cannot be done otherwise (cf. Rosen, 2010, p. 109-114; 
Fine, 2012a, p. 40-42; Audi, 2012a; Raven, 2012). Normal-
ly, ‘grounding’ has been taken as a relation between facts (cf. 
Rosen, 2010; Audi, 2012a, 2012b; Raven, 2012). Some treat-
ments conceive grounding instead as a sentential operator (cf. 
Schnieder, 2011; Fine, 2012a, 2012b), but the normal treat-
ment of grounding as a relation between facts will be followed 
here. The expression ‘[p]’ should be read as ‘the fact that p’. 
The relation of grounding – at least full strict grounding – 
will be expressed as ‘⇐’; i. e., the expression “[p] ⇐ [q]” should 
be read as “the fact that q grounds the fact that p” or “the fact 
that p is grounded on the fact that q”. Grounding is a strict 
partial order, i. e., it is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive and 
non-connected. It is multigrade, because any number of facts 
can be the ground for another. It is non-monotonic, though, 
because the grounds of a fact are just the facts sufficient for its 
obtaining. If [p] ⇐ [q], there is no further fact [r] that could 
be incorporated to the ground for [p]. As in the cases of ‘es-
sence’ and ‘dependence’ presented above, ‘grounding’ cannot 
be analyzed in terms of modal quantified logic. Grounding 
entails modal covariances but is not equivalent to them. In 
fact, if [p] ⇐ [q], then □(q → p). That is, grounding entails a 
strict conditional. Of course, the converse doesn’t hold. 
There are weaker concepts of grounding that can be de-
fined in terms of the relation of grounding introduced here. 
Let ‘partial grounding’ (‘←’) be the relation that obtains be-
tween certain facts in the case where the partial ground with 
other facts is a full ground for the grounded fact. That is:
[Partial ground] [p] ← [q] =
df
 ∃[r
1
] … ∃[r
n
] ([p] ⇐ [q], [r
1
], 
…, [r
n
])
Another important concept is ‘weak grounding’ (‘⇐’). It is 
the relation that holds between facts when one of them is a 
strict ground for the other, or both are identical. That is:
[Weak ground] [p] ⇐ [q] =
df
 (([p] ⇐ [q]) ∨ ([p] = [q]))
Weak grounding is trivially reflexive, antisymmetric and 
transitive5. The notion that will be considered here, though, 
is ‘full strict grounding’. 
Both grounding and dependence are concepts that try 
to do justice to our intuitions of ontological priority in a way 
that goes beyond what can be expressed in quantified modal 
logic6. While dependence has to do with what is ‘constitutive-
ly’ necessary for something, grounding has to do with what is 
‘constitutively’ sufficient for something (cf. Fine, 2015). The 
concepts of grounding and dependence allow the definition 
of two different concepts of ‘ontological priority’ and ‘funda-
mentality’. In effect, something can be called “fundamental” 
because it is ungrounded or because it is independent. In the 
same way, [p] can be called “ontologically prior” to [q] because 
[p] grounds [q], or because the entity or entities involved in 
[q] are dependent on the entity or entities involved in [p]. 
More precisely:
[Fundamental I] [p] is fundamental =
df
 ¬∃[q] ([p] ⇐ [q])
[Priority I] [p] is prior to [q] =
df
 [q] ⇐ [p]
[Fundamental II] x is fundamental =
df
 ¬∃y (x depends on y)
[Priority II] x is prior to y =
df
 y depends on x
These two different concepts of fundamentality and priority 
are not equivalent. Then, something can be fundamental in 
the first sense without being fundamental in the second sense. 
In principle, something ungrounded can be dependent and 
something independent can be grounded. 
3. Emergence as ungrounded 
dependence
As has been pointed out above, something ‘emergent’ 
is, in principle, something ‘over and above’ its base, or some-
thing ‘new’ with resp ect to its base. What makes things com-
plicated is that the emergent should also have some sort of 
ontological connection with its base. Elizabeth Barnes (2012) 
has proposed how to clarify this ‘connectedness’ and ‘novelty’ 
between what is emergent and its base.
Barnes sustains that something emergent with resp ect 
to a certain base should be taken as ‘fundamental’. In the 
senses of fundamentality described above it is fundamental 
in the sense I, that is, it is an ungrounded entity. As indicat-
ed above, it is perfectly compatible to be fundamental in the 
sense I with not being fundamental in the sense II. This is 
precisely what Barnes proposes for emergent entities. They 
are fundamental dependent entities. The emergent turns out to 
be something ‘new’ with resp ect to its base because it is not 
grounded on it, but at the same time there is an ontological 
connection with that base, because the emergent depends 
5 It has been pointed out that there are several advantages in using ‘weak grounding’ as primitive instead of ‘strict grounding’. Cf. Fine, 
2012a, p. 63-71.
6 There have appeared, also, several works offering important reasons for resisting the idea of a general notion of ‘grounding’ and a 
general notion of ‘dependence’. For example, cf. Wilson, 2014. This is not the place for detailed answers to all those reasons. Wilson 
argues that all the supposed work that is attributed to the notion of ‘grounding’ is already done by more specific concepts. In part, all 
the theoretical work that the notions of ‘grounding’ and ‘dependence’ are doing for the elucidation of reduction and emergence – as 
will be pointed out here – is a response to doubts such as those put forward by Wilson and others.
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on it (cf. Barnes, 2012, p. 882-886). Barnes maintains that 
the typical cases of emergence traditionally discussed can be 
handled by this new treatment: minds with resp ect to brains, 
living beings with resp ect to their molecular bases, tropes 
with resp ect to the other tropes with which they constitute 
a bundle, or entangled states in quantum mechanics with re-
sp ect to the particles that compose the state. Barnes also adds 
the case of ‘gunk’, not very familiar in the literature on emer-
gence. ‘Gunk’ is something that has mereological proper parts 
but none of those parts are mereological atoms. That is, it is 
a fusion of parts that also have parts, that also have parts, and 
so on ad infinitum. In an ontology of gunk there is no funda-
mental basic level of objects that might be taken to ground all 
the others. One may suppose that some ‘higher-level’ objects 
can be taken as fundamental. Those objects, nevertheless, are 
dependent on their proper parts. They are ‘emergent’ in the 
sense defended by Barnes. In all these cases, there are proper-
ties on the ‘higher-level’ that seem not determined from the 
complete state of the base. The higher-level, though, cannot 
exist without its base. There is no mind without a functioning 
brain; there is no living being without some or other organic 
molecules of the right kind; there is no quantum entangled 
state of two electrons without such electrons; there is no 
mereological fusion without its parts. 
The main objections against the intelligibility of emer-
gence are related to the issue of emergent causation (cf. Kim, 
1999, 2006), as indicated above. Barnes thinks that she has 
an answer for these concerns. For philosophers of physical-
ist inclinations, causation should be a relation between the 
‘most basic’ physical entities. But emergent facts are not one 
of the physical building blocks of reality. For physicalists, then, 
emergent entities should not have new causal powers. But 
Barnes replies:
Emergent causation is a problem if you sit-
uate it within a levels ontology. Once we 
have levels in place, the physicalist then 
claims warrant to explain all causation solely 
in terms of what is absolutely fundamental 
(the very basic things), which will never in-
clude emergent entities. But the analogous 
claim for the ontological structure assumed 
here looks to be this: all causation can be 
explained solely in terms of what is funda-
mental. In that case, of course, there is no 
causation problem for emergence, since 
emergent entities are fundamental (just not 
independent) (Barnes, 2012, p. 895-896).
That is, the worry for physicalists is that only fundamental 
entities should have causal relevance. But in Barnes’ con-
ception emergent entities are fundamental. So, the problem 
seems solved. One may point out that in Barnes’ conception, 
although emergent entities are fundamental in sense I, they 
are not fundamental in sense II, because they are dependent. 
Isn’t this also a problem? Barnes thinks it is not:
You might think that the analogous claim 
should instead be: all causation can be 
explained solely with reference to inde-
pendent entities. But this seems to be too 
strong. Surely we think that there could still 
be causation in a gunky world, or that a 
mass trope can have causal powers, etc. Re-
stricting to independent entities in this way 
looks unmotivated (Barnes, 2012, p. 896). 
The charge against emergent entities is that they are epiphe-
nomenal. Any causal role that an emergent event may ful-
fill is also a causal role that its base event can fulfill. It seems 
crucial for the appearance of this problem that the emergent 
should be supervenient on its base. Anything for which the 
emergent event might be causally sufficient is also something 
for which the supervenient base of that same emergent event 
is causally sufficient. When one considers the situation from 
the persp ective of grounding and dependence instead of su-
pervenience between the entities in question, important dif-
ferences appear. The main point is that the base event is now 
not sufficient for the emergent event. As indicated above, 
the ground of a fact7 is something constitutively sufficient 
for that fact. In Barnes’ conception of emergence, emergent 
entities are fundamental, so there is nothing on which they 
are grounded. There is nothing, then, on which they might be 
supervenient on, in the relevant sense8. 
In the traditional argument against emergence an emer-
gent event or fact E
1
 causes another event or fact of the same 
ontological level E
2
. If E
1
 is an emergent event, then it has a 
base B
1
. It is supposed that E
2
 also has a base B
2
 – leaving open 
if it is an emergent event or not. The first problem appears be-
cause there are two competitors for explaining the obtaining 
of event E
2
: event E
1
 and its base B
2
. So, under the traditional 
7 ‘Event’ and ‘fact’ are used here interchangeably. There are various theories about the conditions of identity of events. One of the most 
appealed to is the conception in which the conditions of identity of an event are the property or relation, the objects or objects that 
instantiate that property or relation, and the time when that object or objects instantiate that property or relation. These are the same 
conditions of identity postulated for facts.
8 Supervenience is simply a concept of modal covariance, so there are possible cases in which, although there is no grounding between 
two facts, there is supervenience. For example, supervenience is compatible with identity. If facts of type A, for example, reduce to facts 
of type B, then trivially facts of type A supervene on facts of type B. But grounding is incompatible with identity. Supervenience, also, 
is compatible with necessary causal connections between different entities, but causation is incompatible with grounding (however, cf. 
Schaffer, 2016, for a different view about causation and grounding). Nevertheless, in the cases in which philosophers talk about the 
supervenience of one fact on another they have in mind an asymmetric explanatory relation of ontological non-causal determination, i. 
e., grounding.
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scheme the only way in which event E
1
 can be causally effica-
cious for the production of E
2
 is by the downward causation of 
the base B
2
. But now, under the new conception of emergence, 
clearly there is no competition for the explanation of the ob-
taining of E
2
. The base B
2
 is not sufficient for that explanation. 
Event E
2
 is dependent on B
2
, but it is not grounded on B
2
. If 
event E
1
 is going to be causally efficacious for the production 
of E
2
 it should cause the base B
2
, but that base is not suffi-
cient for E
2
, so that it is not by causing B
2
 that E
1
 causes E
2
. On 
the other hand, the base B
1
 is not sufficient for E
1
, because E
1
 
is not grounded on it. One cannot say, then, that the way in 
which E
1
 causes E
2
 is by the fact that B
1
 causes B
2
. Neither the 
base B
1
 is sufficient for causing B
2
, nor the base B
2
 is sufficient 
for the obtaining of E
2
. 
A brief comparison shows the advantages of this treat-
ment with resp ect to the previous proposals by Humphreys 
(1997), O’Connor (2000, p. 108-125) and O’Connor & Wong 
(2005). With respect to Humphreys’ proposal, it is not 
necessary here to introduce a primitive sui generis operation 
of ‘fusion’ between properties. The general ontological rela-
tions of grounding and dependence are enough. With resp ect 
to O’Connor’s and O’Connor & Wong’s view in which emer-
gence is a diachronic and dynamic, it is not necessary to intro-
duce temporal differences between the obtaining of the base 
and the obtaining of the emergent level. 
4. Reduction as grounding?
There seem to be two main contentions in a claim of 
reduction, as indicated above: (i) that the reduced and the 
reducing entities are – in some sense – the ‘same’, and (ii) 
that the reducing entities have explanatory priority over the 
reduced ones. These two contentions seem to be – in a way 
– captured in a claim of grounding. In the first place, claims 
of grounding seem to be claims of non-causal explanation, 
following a direction of explanation from the ground to the 
grounded (cf. Fine, 2012a, p. 37-40; Audi, 2012a, p. 102-108; 
2012b; Correia & Schnieder, 2012b, p. 22-24). In the second 
place, the ground of something is ‘constitutively sufficient’ for 
it, that is, sufficient for the obtaining of the grounded fact due 
to what this grounded fact is, i. e., its essence (cf. Fine, 2012a, 
p. 74-80; 2015). So, in some sense, the grounded fact seems to 
be ‘nothing over or above’ its ground. Fine says, commenting 
on some cases of grounding:
It is for this reason that it is natural in such 
cases to say that the explanans or explanan-
tia are constitutive of the explanandum, or 
that the explanandum’s holding consists in 
nothing more than the obtaining of the ex-
planans or explanantia (Fine, 2012a, p. 39).
It is notorious that here Fine uses the typical expressions 
by which reduction is characterized. Even more, the cas-
es of grounding often cited coincide with cases in which 
some kind of reduction has been in view: normative and 
non-normative facts, dispositional and categorical facts, or 
semantic and socio-psychological facts (cf., for example, 
Rosen, 2010, p. 110-111; Audi, 2012a, p. 106). Rosen has 
also proposed that the best way of formulating a general 
naturalistic metaphysics is by appealing to ‘grounding’. A 
naturalist is a philosopher that sustains that everything is 
grounded on ‘natural’ fundamental facts (cf. Rosen, 2010, 
p. 111-112; they are fundamental in the sense I presented 
above). This sounds very close to saying that everything 
‘reduces’ to natural facts. 
The most precise and explicit treatment of the link be-
tween reduction and grounding has been made by Gideon 
Rosen (cf. 2010, p. 122-126). The link he proposes is straight-
forward: reduction entails grounding. Any claim of reduction 
should be correlated, then, by a connected claim of ground-
ing. There are several asp ects of the way in which Rosen presents 
the question that seem peculiar. ‘Reduction’ is taken as a rela-
tion between propositions in which an ‘account’ is given of the 
entities constituting the reduced propositions:
As I understand the notion, reduction is a 
metaphysical matter. To say that p reduces 
to q is not to say that p and q are synony-
mous, or that q gives the meaning of p. It 
is to give an account of what it is for p to 
obtain (Rosen, 2010, p. 122).
The main difference between reduction and grounding is 
that, while grounding is a relation between facts, reduction 
is a relation between propositions. In the way in which Rosen 
envisages propositions and facts, both are structured entities 
constituted by objects and properties. For every proposition, 
there is a corresponding fact, and vice-versa. The ‘proposition 
that p’ is expressed as “<p>”. Then, the link reduction/ground-
ing can be expressed thus:
[Reduction-Grounding Link] If <p> is true and <p> reduces 
to <q>, then [p] ⇐ [q].
Reduction claims show what it is for the reduced proposition 
to obtain. Rosen considers as cases of reduction, for example 
(cf. Rosen, 2010, p. 123-125), that to be equal to 2 reduces to 
be equal to the successor of 1; that for the number of Fs to 
be equal to the number of Gs reduces to there being a one-
to-one and unto function between the Fs and the Gs; that to 
be a bachelor reduces to be an unmarried male; or that to be 
a square reduces to be an equilateral rectangle. There is an 
obvious problem with this proposal, though. The property of 
being a bachelor just seems to be identical to the property of 
being an unmarried male. It seems to be numerically the same 
property. But grounding is an irreflexive relation. Then, it 
seems impossible for the property of being an unmarried male 
to ground the property of being a bachelor, because nothing 
grounds itself. The solution Rosen offers for this problem 
gives us pause:
José Tomás Alvarado
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We can resist this line of thought by insist-
ing that the operation of replacing a worldly 
item in a fact with its real definition never 
yields the same fact again. It yields a new 
fact that ‘unpacks’ or ‘analyzes’ the orig-
inal. To see that this is plausible, consider 
an example involving the real definition of 
an individual. Suppose for the sake of argu-
ment that to be the number two just is to 
be the successor of 1. In our notation, for 
all x, <x = 2> reduces to <x = s(1)>. One 
might accept this while rejecting the exotic 
view that the number 2 somehow contains 
the number 1 as part or constituent (Rosen, 
2010, p. 124-125).
According to Rosen, all cases of reduction are cases of 
grounding – that is, full strict grounding – because all the cas-
es in which it appears that there are different representations 
of the same property, fact, or phenomenon are cases in which 
there are really different properties, facts or phenomena. 
More clarity about the issues involved here requires 
more clarity about the relata of grounding and, eventually, 
about the relata of reduction. As indicated above, usually 
philosophers have postulated ‘facts’ as relata for grounding. 
In general, a ‘fact’ is conceived as a structured entity with 
properties and objects as constituents. Of course, different 
metaphysical positions concerning the nature of a particular 
object or the nature of a property induce also differences in 
this general scheme. If one, for example, maintains that ob-
jects are bundles of properties, then there will be no need to 
posit objects besides properties as constituents of facts. If one 
maintains that there are no properties, because – for example 
– classes of resembling objects are sufficient for all the func-
tions attributed to properties, then there will be no need to 
posit properties besides objects as constituents of facts. The 
distinction that is of relevance here, nevertheless, is that be-
tween ‘sparse’ and ‘abundant’ properties. It is not important 
to detail here what fulfills the functions usually attributed to 
a property – universals, tropes, resemblance classes of objects, 
etc. There are two broad sets of functions that properties are 
expected to fulfill and these sets of functions determine either 
a conception in which properties are ‘abundant’ or a concep-
tion in which properties are ‘sparse’ (cf. Lewis, 1983, p. 10-
19). Among the philosophers that have proposed theories of 
grounding some have preferred facts with ‘coarse-grain’ con-
ditions of identity and others have preferred facts with ‘fine-
grain’ conditions of identity (cf. Correia & Schnieder, 2012b, 
p. 14-16). Facts with ‘coarse-grain’ conditions of identity are 
correlated with ‘sparse’ properties as constituents. Facts with 
‘fine-grain’ conditions of identity are correlated with ‘abun-
dant’ properties as constituents. 
‘Sparse’ properties are those that must appear in a com-
plete description of reality. They determine what causal pow-
ers have their bearers. Laws of nature should include those 
properties. Possession of those properties determines objective 
resemblances between objects. We come to know what ‘sparse’ 
properties exist normally by empirical research and not only 
by a priori reflection. It usually is natural science who decides 
what properties really exist and not the philosopher. When it 
comes to ‘abundant’ properties, on the other hand, there are as 
many as sets. For any collection of objects there is a property 
that those objects and only those objects instantiate. There is 
a property instantiated by anything that is ‘grue’, for example. 
There are negative properties, like the property instantiated 
by all and only objects that are not quarks. There are enough 
abundant properties to assign semantic values to any possible 
predicate of our languages or for a language of angels. 
‘Facts’ are essentially the instantiation of a property in an 
object at a time – or the instantiation of a relation in some ob-
jects at a time. Its conditions of identity are those property, ob-
ject – or objects – and time. If two facts are constituted by the 
same property, the same object – or objects – and the same time, 
then they are the same fact. The problem here is that there is a 
big difference if properties are taken to be ‘sparse’ or ‘abundant’. 
For a defender of sparse properties there are facts only for real 
properties for which it makes sense to be – or not – instantiated 
in something. It might be true, for example, that ‘x is not a quark’, 
but there is no ‘fact’ of x being a non-quark. There is no negative 
property of being a non-quark. If there is no such property, then 
there is no such fact. Of course, also, there may be different ex-
pressions for referring to the same property. If heat is identical to 
mean molecular kinetic energy, then the fact of there being a lot 
of heat here is the same fact of there being a lot of mean molecu-
lar kinetic energy here. Not any sentence in our languages is cor-
related with a corresponding ‘fact’. Although it seems easy to put 
square brackets around a sentence p, there is no guarantee that 
the expression [p] is successful in referring to a fact if properties 
are taken as ‘sparse’. This situation is completely different if facts 
are constituted by ‘abundant’ properties. It doesn’t matter if the 
predicate of a sentence is satisfied by extremely heterogeneous 
objects. A predicate can be as gerrymandered as “grue” or “bleen”. 
There is certainly a unique property that all and only the objects 
that satisfy that predicate will instantiate. There are, then, neg-
ative and disjunctive facts. And, what is more relevant for the 
discussion here, facts that under a ‘sparse’ conception of proper-
ties may be identified, are kept distinct and separate under an 
‘abundant’ conception of properties. 
Then, if the suggestion of Rosen that there are different 
facts of being a bachelor and being an unmarried male is go-
ing to work, it is clear that a ‘fine-grained’ conception of the 
conditions of identity of facts is required. Somehow, it should 
be justified that the property – if there is any – of being a 
bachelor is different from the property of being an unmarried 
male; or that the property of being a square is different from 
the property of being an equilateral rectangle. It is charact er-
istic of theories of ‘abundant’ properties that the conditions 
of identity of properties are determined by their composi-
tional structure (cf. Jubien, 1989; Swoyer, 1998). Even if it is 
necessary that everything instantiates P
1
 if and only if it in-
stantiates P
2
, properties P
1
 and P
2
 may be different. Suppose 
that property P
1
 is ‘atomic’ or ‘basic’, while P
2
 results from the 
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conjunction of properties P
3
 and P
4
. The compositional struc-
ture of P
2
 differentiates it from P
1
, even if the causal powers 
given by both properties were the same. Then, for example, 
the property of being a square is different from the property 
of being an equilateral rectangle. The latter includes as con-
stituents two properties while the former has no constituents.
But how wise is it to endorse a fine-grained conception of 
facts and the Reduction-Grounding Link? Any decision between 
fine-grained and coarse-grained facts requires a decision as to 
whether properties are really ‘sparse’ or ‘abundant’. Obviously, 
that cannot be done in this work9. There are, nevertheless, ad-
ditional reasons to reject outright the Reduction-Grounding Link. 
Such a link could have unacceptable consequences. If Rosen is 
right, then heat, for example, should be something different from 
mean molecular kinetic energy; genes should be different from 
DNA molecules; and light should be different from beams of 
photons. Whatever the problems involved in these particular 
examples as examples of reduction, there seems to be something 
wrong in the contention that – in virtue of the nature of the re-
lation of reduction – if we come to have justification enough to 
endorse a claim of reduction in any of these cases, then we will 
be obliged to postulate the ontological difference between the re-
ducing and the reduced. There is never a case in which we gain 
epistemic understanding by coming to know that what seem to 
be different entities, properties or phenomena are just the same. 
He rejects the cases of explanatory identity in which learning 
that, for example, two properties are identical has explanatory 
value. The identification of reduction with grounding, far from 
being an elucidation of the former, turns out to be its denial. 
Even granting to Rosen that many cases of purported reduction 
of some facts to others are really cases of full strict grounding, he 
should allow at least for the possibility of cases in which two prop-
erties, facts or phenomena are identical, and in which learning 
this has explanatory value. It may be wise to reserve the expres-
sion “reduction” precisely for those situations. In any case, if one 
prefers to use the expression “reduction” not so strictly, one must 
admit that there can be situations of explanatory identity that 
are not cases of grounding. 
5. Conclusions
Recent developments concerning the concepts of 
‘grounding’ and ‘dependence’ have brought important advan-
tages. Those concepts seem more precise and ontological-
ly more suited for the treatment of ontological relations of 
priority. It is clear that some kind of ontological relations of 
priority is involved in the many cases traditionally treated as 
cases of reduction or cases of emergence. What the examina-
tion of the proposals of Rosen and Barnes shows is that these 
connections look promising, but with mixed success. 
With resp ect to the connection of reduction with 
grounding proposed by Rosen, the Reduction-Grounding Link 
seems not advisable. The most typical cases of reduction ap-
pear to be cases of identification of properties, facts or entities, 
but identity precludes grounding. Maybe many traditional 
cases of reduction are really cases of grounding, but certainly 
there is a conceptual distinction that should be resp ected be-
tween grounding and identities with explanatory value. In the 
case of emergence, though, the treatment proposed by Barnes 
seems correct, simple and better suited than its previous al-
ternatives to handle some traditional difficulties.  
Then, the introduction of the concepts of grounding and 
dependence allows us to fix certain important ontological re-
lations that determine what is usually charact erized as ‘onto-
logical levels’. There is grounding of one fact by other or others 
– which presupposes the numerical differences between the 
grounded fact and the grounding fact. There is dependence of 
one entity on another. An ungrounded dependent entity is 
emergent. There is the case, also, in which facts or entities that 
seem to be numerically different are really identical. When 
there is explanatory gain in learning about this identity, it is a 
case of reduction. Of course, there is the case in which a sup-
posed fact simply does not exist, and all the theoretical work 
attributed to the putative entity is done by another. This is a 
case of elimination – that is incompatible both with grounding 
and dependence. There is, finally, the case of an independent 
grounded entity. A case like this is the contrary of emergence 
and corresponds to what has been called realization. More 
precision in the treatment of these different concepts, and in 
the different kinds of ontological ‘priority’ and ‘fundamental-
ity’ that result, is very welcome10. 
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